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ABSTRACT——————————————————————————————————
Using conﬁdential data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, we document a new set
of facts regarding the behavior of U.S. multinational ﬁrms. First, we ﬁnd that intra-ﬁrm
trade is concentrated among a small number of large afﬁliates. The median afﬁliate re-
ports no shipments to the parent, and directs the bulk of its sales to unrelated parties in its
country of operation. In this sense, “horizontal” rather than “vertical” FDI seems to bet-
ter capture the role of most U.S. afﬁliates abroad. Second, multinational ﬁrms often own
vertically linked afﬁliates, as deﬁned by the input-output coefﬁcients between their re-
spective industries of operation. These vertical chains, however, are not associated with
a corresponding intra-ﬁrm ﬂow of physical goods between upstream and downstream
units of production. Our ﬁndings suggest that a comparative advantage of multinational
corporations is their ability to transfer intangible—rather than physical—inputs along
vertically linked production units.
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Multinational ﬁrms dominate foreign commerce through both foreign afﬁliate sales and
international trade. In 1999, the foreign afﬁliates of U.S. multinational ﬁrms accounted for
$566.4 billion of value added (approximately 6 percent of U.S. GDP) and $2,219 billion of
sales, of which 63 percent were sales to unrelated parties in the country of operation. U.S.
parents are also large exporters and importers, accounting in 1999 for 57 percent of total
U.S. exports in goods, and 35 percent of total U.S. imports of goods. 40 percent of parent
exports are shipped to afﬁliates and 44 percent of parent imports come from afﬁliates.1
Based on these ﬁgures, the literature aimed at understanding the patterns of for-
eign direct investment (FDI) has distinguished two main motives for locating production
abroad. On the one hand, a ﬁrm may want to locate production in the destination market
to save on transport costs; this mode is known as horizontal FDI. Exports and multina-
tional production are, in this case, two alternative ways of supplying a foreign market.2
On the other hand, the literature has pointed to comparative advantage across countries
as a motive for the foreign location of some stages of production; this mode is known as
vertical FDI. In this case, intra-ﬁrm trade between parents and afﬁliates producing verti-
cally linked goods is a complement of FDI.3
In this paper we revisit the evidence on the motives for FDI by looking at the ﬁrm
level data collected by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Our ﬁndings suggest
that, for the large part, afﬁliates do not exist to facilitate the physical shipment of goods
within the ﬁrm, but rather, their main purpose seems to be to supply the destination
market. In this sense, horizontal, rather than vertical, FDI appears to be the main motive
for establishing afﬁliates abroad.
1These magnitudes refer to majority-owned, non-bank afﬁliates of American ﬁrms abroad, from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Imports and exports in goods are from the Balance of Payments, also
from the BEA.
2See Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Brainard (1997), Markusen and Venables (2000), and Helpman,
Melitz and Yeaple (2004), among others.
3See Helpman (1984), Yeaple (2003), and Keller and Yeaple (2009). Ramondo and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (2009)
and Irrazabal, Moxnes and Opromolla (2010) combine the two motives for FDI into a uniﬁed framework.
2We document that, although intra-ﬁrm trade represents an important share of overall
U.S. imports and exports, it is concentrated among a small number of large ﬁrms. For
most U.S. multinational ﬁrms, intra-ﬁrm trade represents a small fraction of the afﬁliate’s
operations, both relative to their input costs and total sales. In 1999, the median manufac-
turing afﬁliate received only 0.12 percent of its inputs from the parent ﬁrm, and sold 97
percent of its production to domestic unrelated parties; 60 percent of afﬁliates report no
shipments to the parent.4
Despite the lack of intra-ﬁrm trade relative to the overall activities of the majority of
afﬁliates, multinational corporations often own vertical production chains: most afﬁliates
operate in industries upstream or downstream from those of the parent. Looking at the
seven largest industries of operation of both parents and afﬁliates, disaggregated at the
four digit level according to the BEA’s NAICS-based International Surveys Industry (ISI)
classiﬁcation, we document that afﬁliates are mostly single-industry units, and 60 percent
operate in the same primary industry as the parent. Of those that produce in a different
industry, 91 percent are vertically linked with the parent, as deﬁned by the input-output
matrix. We ﬁnd that parent-afﬁliate pairs are more likely to be vertically linked when the
afﬁliate is located in a small country or if the afﬁliate belongs to a large ﬁrm. We also ﬁnd
that industry pairs with stronger vertical links are more likely to have foreign afﬁliates
and that these afﬁliates are larger, as measured by employment.
Nonetheless, these vertical links are not matched with a corresponding intra-ﬁrm
trade ﬂow between upstream and downstream units of production. The presence of a
vertical link between parent and afﬁliate, as deﬁned by the input-output matrix, does not
predict the existence and volume of intra-ﬁrm ﬂows. In our empirical work, the coefﬁ-
cient that captures the effect of the vertical link between parent and afﬁliate on the trade
ﬂow between those two parties, is virtually zero, and usually, precisely estimated. For in-
stance, an increase in our measure of vertical linkage is not found to affect the likelihood
4The skewness of intra-ﬁrm trade towards large multinational ﬁrms is consistent with the theoretical
predictions in Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2006).
3that an afﬁliate ships goods back to the parent. When restricting the sample to only those
afﬁliates that register positive intra-ﬁrm ﬂows, a 10 percent increase in our measure of the
vertical link between an upstream afﬁliate and its parent, is associated with an increase in
the intra-ﬁrm shipments of goods from the afﬁliate, as share of its total sales, of only 0.5
percent (s.d. 0.0233).
Our paper is closely related to Alfaro and Charlton (2009). Based on world wide in-
formation on ownership and industry of operation of parents and afﬁliates, they ﬁnd
that multinationals tend to own afﬁliates that operate the stages of production “vertically
proximate” to their ﬁnal production, according to the input-output matrix. Their result
is similar to our ﬁnding that multinational corporations often own vertical production
chains. Not having information on the intra-ﬁrm ﬂows of physical goods, Alfaro and
Charlton (2009) interpret this input-output “closeness” between parent and afﬁliates as
evidence of vertical FDI. In our data we do observe the ﬂows between parents and af-
ﬁliates, so we are able to establish whether the presence of the vertical chain is a good
predictor of intra-ﬁrm ﬂows. We ﬁnd that intra-ﬁrm ﬂows are surprisingly low along
the identiﬁed vertical chains, and we ﬁnd that these ﬂows are not associated with the
presence of a vertical link between the parent and afﬁliate.
The empirical patterns we document do not seem to be exclusive to U.S. multination-
als. Irrazabaletal.(2010), usingasimilardatasetontheNorwegianmanufacturingsector,
for 2004, ﬁnd that 62 percent of total afﬁliate sales are to the local market. Additionally,
Norwegian parent imports from destinations where they have afﬁliates are, on average,
6 percent of afﬁliate sales. Our ﬁndings are also consistent with Hortacsu and Syverson
(2009) who study the domestic operations of U.S. multi-plant ﬁrms. They ﬁnd that ship-
ments between establishments owned by the same ﬁrm are surprisingly low. Moreover,
they report that sales by vertically linked establishments are, for the most part, destined
to non-related parties located near the productive unit.
Our paper is also closely related to the large empirical literature on vertical FDI. We
4ﬁnd, consistent with the existing literature, that intra-ﬁrm shipments into the United
States are positively related to the income per capita of the host country, but negatively
related to host country size and distance to the United States.5 Also consistent with the
literature, we ﬁnd that the income level of the host country and the distance to the United
States are signiﬁcantly and negatively related to the existence and the volume of exports
from the U.S. parent to their afﬁliates.6
Given our ﬁndings, an important question arises: If shipment of goods along the ver-
tical chain does not appear to be the motive for owning afﬁliates, why do ﬁrms own
vertically integrated chains? Similarly to Hortacsu and Syverson (2009) for U.S. domes-
tic ﬁrms, we conjecture that the role of vertical links is related to the transfer within the
corporation of certain capabilities. Strong input-output requirements between two goods
may signal the usage of a common set of speciﬁc intangible inputs. These intangibles can
be understood as knowledge capital (Markusen (1984)), technology capital (McGrattan
and Prescott (2010)), or managerial ability (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006)).
For example, consider the case of Converted Paper Products (NAICS 3222)—stationary
andenvelopes—whichusesPaper(NAICS3221)asitsmaininput. Theproductionofthese
goods likely involves similar knowledge about the quality of the materials, demand, sup-
pliers, and competition that can be transmitted among the different units within the ﬁrm.
Sharing these intangibles can be a source comparative advantage in the production of
vertically linked goods, even in the absence of physical shipments between afﬁliates.7
Overall, our ﬁndings contribute to understanding the determinants of vertical and hori-
zontal FDI, and more broadly, the boundaries of the multinational ﬁrm.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data.
Section 3 reports the importance of intra-ﬁrm ﬂows for U.S. foreign afﬁliates. Section
5See Yeaple (2006), Nunn (2007), Nunn and Treﬂer (2008), Chor, Foley and Manova (2008), Bernard,
Jensen and Schott (2009), and Costinot, Oldensky and Rauch (2011), among others. Most of the tests in
these papers has been motivated by the work by Albuquerque (2003) and Antras and Helpman (2004).
6See Borga and Zeila (2004), Hanson, Mataloni Jr. and Slaughter (2005), and Yeaple (2006).
7In a calibration exercise, Irrazabal et al. (2010) also interpret most of the intra-ﬁrm ﬂows between afﬁli-
ates and parent to be in the form of intangible inputs.
54 presents estimates of the relationship between vertical links, ownership, and intra-ﬁrm
ﬂows of foreign afﬁliates. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 performs some robust-
ness analysis, and section 7 concludes.
2 The Data
Our ﬁrm level data are collected by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis for the purpose
of producing aggregate statistics on the operations of multinational companies. These
data cover the universe of U.S. parents and their foreign afﬁliates in the year 1999. Parent
and afﬁliate data are reported at different levels of aggregation. Parent data aggregate all
U.S.-located company operations that are part of the fully consolidated ﬁrm. In the case of
foreign afﬁliates, the data are, in general, more disaggregated at the afﬁliate level. Some
afﬁliates of the same parent may report in a consolidated manner if they are located in the
same country and are in the same four-digit industry. Afﬁliates may never consolidate
across countries.
Detailed data on afﬁliate operations must be reported if afﬁliate sales, assets, or net
income (loss) are greater than $7 million. Of the 40,155 existing afﬁliates, 23,980 are large
enough to report.8 The reporting cutoff level is low: Reporting afﬁliates account for 99.6
percent of total afﬁliate assets and 99 percent of total afﬁliate sales. Of these 23,980 af-
ﬁliates, we keep the majority owned (more than 50 percent ownership by the parent),
nonbank afﬁliates of nonbank parents. After dropping afﬁliates that do not report dis-
aggregated sales, our sample consists of 19,224 afﬁliates that account for 81 percent of
multinational sales.9 Our analysis centers on manufacturing parents and afﬁliates; of
those, our sample accounts for 85 percent of foreign multinational sales. Detail of the
sample restrictions are presented in table 1.
8For afﬁliates that do not report, their total sales, employment, and assets are reported by the parent.
9We also drop 315 afﬁliates that do not report data on the costs of inputs, or the ratio of goods shipped
from parent for resale or further processing (alternatively) to total costs of inputs is bigger than one. These
observations only account for 0.2 percent of total sales of afﬁliates.
6For each afﬁliate and parent in our data, we observe sales broken out in various ways.
In one breakout, parents and afﬁliates report sales in each of their seven largest industries.
These industries are classiﬁed according to the International Surveys Industry (ISI) clas-
siﬁcation, which is roughly equivalent to the 1996 NAICS. When we need a broad catego-
rization of a ﬁrm—to claim, for example, that a ﬁrm is in the manufacturing sector—we
use the industry code with the largest volume of sales. In our sample, afﬁliates span a
total of 195 four-digit industries; 77 when the sample is restricted to manufacturing (see
table 1). Afﬁliates are typically more focused on a core industry than the parent. On aver-
age, 84 percent of the parent’s sales are in its main industry of operation, compared to 96
percent for afﬁliates; in manufacturing, 81 percent of a parent’s sales are in the primary
industry, and for afﬁliates, it is 95 percent.
The data for the parents reports an aggregate of all company operations of the fully
consolidated ﬁrm located in the United States. This may make parents seem artiﬁcially
more diverse than afﬁliates. For comparison, we also aggregate the operations of all the
afﬁliates owned by the parent, by country; still, the share of sales in the primary industry
is considerably higher than for the parent, 91 percent (89 percent for afﬁliates in manu-
facturing). The data are very skewed: the median afﬁliate operates in a single industry
while larger afﬁliates (weighted by their level of employment) operate in a larger set of
industries (see panel 2 in table 2).
Our main results are made possible by data on the destination of afﬁliate sales. Sales
can be directed to the parent, unafﬁliated U.S. parties, local afﬁliates, local unafﬁliated
parties, afﬁliated parties in neither the U.S. nor the host country (what we call “other
countries”), and unafﬁliated parties in other countries. Importantly, we observe the sales
of the afﬁliate to the parent in total, as well as the sales from the parent ﬁrm to the afﬁliate
in total, in goods “for further processing,” and in goods “for resale.” Being able to observe
the ﬂows between parents and afﬁliates is a unique feature of these data, and will allow
us to say much more about how parents use (or do not use) afﬁliates to move goods
7across countries. Table 2 presents a ﬁrst description of these intra-ﬁrm ﬂows. The median
afﬁliate does not report any physical shipment of goods to or from the parent ﬁrm and
sells exclusively to local unrelated parties. In the case of manufacturing, these ﬁgures are
hardly changed: the median afﬁliate sells 97 percent of its production to the local market,
and receives 0.1 percent of its inputs from the parent ﬁrm. Although the median ﬁrm does
not engage in intra-ﬁrm trade, those that do tend to be larger: weighted by the afﬁliates’
level of employment, average sales to local unrelated parties drops to 58 percent of the
afﬁliates’ total production, and the inputs shipped from the parent account for 8 percent
of the afﬁliates’ total input costs (see panels 3 and 4 in table 2).
In what follows, when we analyze shipment from the parent to the afﬁliate, we focus
on the shipment of goods for further processing, and disregard trade of ﬁnal goods for
resale. Trade in goods for resale corresponds to afﬁliates operating in retail or wholesale
industries; they do not participate in the production process. We think that these afﬁliate
sales are better described theoretically by models of international trade, rather than mod-
els of FDI. For that reason, in most of the analysis below we focus on parent-afﬁliate pairs
in which both parties operate in manufacturing industries. As reported in panel 4, table 2
(columns 4 to 6), shipments of ﬁnal goods for distribution from the parent to the afﬁliate
are virtually absent in our sample of manufacturing ﬁrms.
3 Patterns of Intra-ﬁrm Flows
TraditionalmodelsofverticalFDIassumethataparentcreatesanafﬁliateinordertocarry
out some stages of the production process, and that the home country remains the main
destination market of the ﬁrm: Production involves ﬂows of goods between the parent
and the afﬁliate. In contrast, models of horizontal FDI are based on the assumption that
a parent creates an afﬁliate to produce in, and to sell to, the host country. If a parent-
afﬁliate relationship is horizontal, we would expect to see little trade between the parent
8and afﬁliate, and most sales of the afﬁliate directed to the market of operation. There will
be, of course, mixtures of vertical and horizontal FDI, but the relevance of intra-ﬁrm ﬂows
will provide information about the primary motive for establishing an afﬁliate.
To broadly frame our discussion, consider the following conﬁguration possibilities for
a parent-afﬁliate pair.
1. The parent may send partially ﬁnished goods to the afﬁliate to be completed, and
then some, or all, of the goods may be shipped back to the parent;
2. The afﬁliate may produce the good without any shipments from the parent (though
the afﬁliate may be receiving goods from other parties) and ship ﬁnished goods to
the parent;
3. The afﬁliate may produce a partially completed good and ship it to the parent to
ﬁnish production.
In these examples, we would expect to observe shipments from the afﬁliate to the parent,
and in the ﬁrst example, we would expect to observe shipments from the parent to the
afﬁliate.
As mentioned in the introduction, U.S. multinational ﬁrms account for a large share of
U.S. exports and imports. According to the aggregate ﬁgures from the BEA, in 1999, U.S.
parents accounted for 57 percent of U.S. exports of goods and 35 percent of U.S. imports of
goods. Approximately 40 percent of parent exports are to afﬁliates and 44 percent of par-
ent imports are from afﬁliates. The remaining 60 percent of parent exports and 56 percent
of parent imports are undertaken at arms-length. Restricting the sample to manufactur-
ing ﬁrms, total afﬁliates shipments to the parent totaled $138,636 million, representing
13 percent of total manufacturing afﬁliate sales, and approximately 16 percent of U.S.
manufacturing imports. Exports from U.S. parents in manufacturing to afﬁliates abroad
were $108,350 million, 92 percent of which were in goods for further processing; about 6
percent of manufacturing parent shipments were goods for distribution. These intra-ﬁrm
9shipments accounted for almost 20 percent of U.S. manufacturing exports.10 Notice that
these numbers imply a ratio of total afﬁliate sales to total U.S. exports in manufacturing
goods of around two, as commonly reported, and a ratio of 1.2 for total afﬁliate sales to
total U.S. imports in the same sector.
Behind these aggregate numbers, however, there is great heterogeneity at the ﬁrm,
industry, and country level. Intra-ﬁrm trade is concentrated among a small number of
large afﬁliates abroad. As described in panels 3 and 4 of table 2, the average afﬁliate
ships only 4.3 percent of its production to the parent; the average rises to 6 percent if
only manufacturing ﬁrms are considered. Meanwhile, shipments of goods for further
processing from the parent represent, on average, a small fraction of the afﬁliate’s total
input costs, about 3 percent (8 percent when we restrict the sample to manufacturing
ﬁrms). The average intra-ﬁrm ﬂow is larger when weighted by the size (employment)
of the afﬁliate, as reported in columns 3 and 6. The median manufacturing afﬁliate does
not report shipments to or from the parent, and sells 97 percent of its output to local
unafﬁliated parties.
For a striking majority of afﬁliates, shipping goods to the parent does not seem to be
the main purpose of their activity. We explore this further in ﬁgure 1. This histogram
plots the distribution of afﬁliates by the share of total afﬁliate sales that go to the parent.
We report this histogram for the entire sample, for parent-afﬁliate pairs in manufactur-
ing, and for North American motor vehicles (ISI 3361-3363). The histograms make it clear
that very little is shipped from the afﬁliate to the parent. In the entire sample, more than
90 percent of afﬁliates ship less than 5 percent of their output to the parent. The entire
sample, however, includes service industries in which we would expect to see little trade
regardless of the mode of FDI. When we restrict the sample to the manufacturing sector,
86 percent of afﬁliates ship less than 5 percent of their output to the parents, and an aston-
ishing 60 percent of the afﬁliates in our sample report no shipments to the headquarters
10Data refer to majority-owned afﬁliates in the manufacturing sector, from the BEA. Data on U.S. imports
and exports in manufacturing goods are from the U.S. Census. All data are for 1999.
10(columns 1 and 5 in panel 1 of table 3). The third group of parent-afﬁliate pairs is re-
stricted to afﬁliates in the motor vehicle industries in Canada and Mexico. Even in this
sub-sample, more than 60 percent of afﬁliates ship less than 5 percent of their output to
the parent, but almost 15 percent of afﬁliates ship more than 90 percent of output to their
parent, as a model of vertical FDI would predict. This industry, however, is an exception:
no other industry has more than 3-4 percent of its afﬁliates selling more than 90 percent
of output to the parent.
The absence of trade from the afﬁliate to the parent is mirrored by the ﬂows from
the parent to the afﬁliate. Figure 2 presents an histogram of the value of the parent’s
shipments to the afﬁliate in goods for further processing as a share of the afﬁliate’s total
input cost. Again, very little trade in goods takes place within the ﬁrm. More than 80
percentofafﬁliatessourcelessthan5percentoftheirinputsfromtheirparentﬁrm. Infact,
almost half of the afﬁliates report zero trade from their parent. Similarly to the afﬁliate
to parent ﬂow, when we restrict the sample to parents and afﬁliates in manufacturing,
the results are hardly changed. Afﬁliates in Canada and Mexico, in the motor vehicles
sector, are more likely to source inputs from their parent, but these inputs still represent
a relatively small fraction of total input purchases done by the afﬁliate.
4 Vertical Links, Ownership, and Intra-ﬁrm Flows
In the previous section we documented that very few afﬁliates send goods to, or receive
goods from, their parents, suggesting that most FDI is not undertaken to promote vertical
specialization, but rather, to serve the market of operation. In this section, we analyze the
ownership structure of multinational ﬁrms in terms of their vertical integration, and we
ﬁnd that most parent-afﬁliate pairs operate in vertically related industries. This ﬁnding,
along with the one in the previous section, suggests that while multinational ﬁrms own
afﬁliates in upstream and downstream industries, they do not do so with the purpose of
11facilitating the transfer of goods along the production chain.
4.1 Do Vertical Links Predict Ownership?
We begin by determining which of our parent-afﬁliate pairs are vertically linked. We
follow Alfaro and Charlton (2009) and Hortacsu and Syverson (2009) and base our clas-
siﬁcation on the industries in which each ﬁrm operates. We observe a parent in industry
i and its afﬁliate in industry j. To what extent are industries i and j—and, by extension,
parent and afﬁliate—dependent on each other for inputs into production?
To characterize the input relationships between industries, we use the direct require-
ments table for the United States in 1997. (In the robustness section, we also show results
using the total requirements table.) In the direct requirements table, an observation is a
commodity-industry pair and the direct requirements coefﬁcient, denoted by dij, speci-
ﬁes the amount of inputs from industry i needed to produce one dollar of output in the
industry j. The commodities and industries are deﬁned using the Input-Output industry
classiﬁcation, which we map into the BEA NAICS-based ISI classiﬁcation. There are 77
manufacturing industries in the classiﬁcation. Of the 5929 possible commodity-industry
pairs, 57.5 percent (3406) of them are non-zero.
The direct requirements matrix is an important input into our vertical link measures.
In ﬁgure 3 we summarize the characteristics of the direct requirements matrix. The axes
are the industry codes (manufacturing codes lie between 3111 and 3399); The x-axis is
the using industry and the y-axis is the producing industry. In panel 3a we place a mark
at each industry pair for which the direct requirement is greater than 0.001 and less than
0.05. In panel 3b we place a mark at each industry pair for which the direct requirement is
greater than 0.05. It is immediately clear that most industries require inputs from similar
industries: the entries in the direct requirements matrix tend to be largest on or near the
diagonal.11
11As noticed by Alfaro and Charlton (2009), since requirements coefﬁcients are large on or near the di-
12Table 3 (panel 1) provides a simple measure of the extent of vertical relationships in
our data. Parent-afﬁliate pairs are classiﬁed according to the vertical links between their
main industries of operation (i.e., drap and drpa). We consider an afﬁliate to be upstream
vis-a-vis the parent, if the direct requirements coefﬁcient of the primary industry, drap,
is positive. Analogously, the afﬁliate is downstream if the corresponding direct require-
ments coefﬁcient of the primary industry, drpa, is positive. This simple measure suggests
that almost all of the observed parent-afﬁliate pairs exist in vertical production relation-
ships. In the sample of manufacturing parents and afﬁliates, 92 percent of parent-afﬁliate
pairs have either a downstream parent, a downstream afﬁliate, or both.
More formally, we investigate the extent to which these vertical links predict multina-
tional ownership. Following Alfaro and Charlton (2009), we estimate a Tobit speciﬁcation
that accounts for the effect of vertical links on both the likelihood of owning afﬁliates and





vdrpa + cXc + pXp + cpXc  Xp + apc: (1)
The unit of observation is a triplet, apc, that refers to the primary industry of the afﬁli-
ate, the primary industry of parent, and the afﬁliate’s country of location. We measure
multinational activity, FDIapc, by: (1) the number of afﬁliates in country c, industry of the
parent p, and industry of the afﬁliate a; and (2) total employment of afﬁliates in country c,
industry of the parent p, and industry of the afﬁliate a. Our manufacturing sample spans
64 host countries and 77  77 industry pairs, for a total of 379,456 possible combinations,
many of which display no multinational activity. To estimate equation (1) we aggregate
the ﬁrm-level data on the number of afﬁliates and the employment of afﬁliates to derive
FDIapc.
The variables drap and drpa correspond to the direct requirements coefﬁcients between
agonal for four-digit industries, an important share of the vertical chains is unreported when the data are
aggregated to the two-digit level.
13the (principal) industry of the parent and afﬁliate, with the afﬁliate in the upstream and
downstream industry, respectively. The coefﬁcients u
v and d
v indicate the importance of
vertical chains as determinants of the number (and size of) foreign afﬁliates in a country
and parent-afﬁliate industry pair.
The vector Xc contains country-level controls: the host country GDP and GDP per
capita from the Penn World Table 6.3, as documented in Heston, Summers and Aten
(2009); the distance to the United States from CEPII, as documented in Mayer and Zig-
nago (2006); a measure of the rule of law from Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer and Walsh
(2001); the average years of schooling attainment from Barro and Lee (2000); and the
capital-output ratio from Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005). The vector Xp contains
parent-industry controls: the capital and skill intensity of the parent’s primary industry,
from the NBER-CES manufacturing industry database from Becker and Gray (2009). Ad-
ditionally, as is customary in the literature, we include a term that interacts the industry
factor intensity with the host country factor abundance.
Columns 2 and 5 in table 4 present the baseline results for the number and total em-
ployment of afﬁliates, respectively. Larger upstream and downstream direct require-
ments between the main industry of operation of the parent and the afﬁliate are found
to be signiﬁcant predictors of FDI ﬂows. Moreover, comparing the pseudo R2 in columns
1 and 2 (4 and 6 in the case of employment size), the explanatory power of the regression
almost doubles when the vertical link measures are added.12
The coefﬁcients of the Tobit regressions are not straightforward to interpret as they
combine the effects on the probability of having afﬁliates as well as their number and
size. We observe afﬁliates in only 3,277 of the 379,456 potential country-afﬁliate-parent-
industry combinations. Therefore, the probability of observing an afﬁliate is very small
(0:0086 = 3;277=379;456) and the overall Tobit coefﬁcients are, correspondingly, large.
In particular, an increase in the direct requirements coefﬁcients from the 50th to the 75th
12Table 4 reports McFadden’s (adjusted) pseudo R2 which are increasing in the likelihood of the model.
14percentile (i.e., from 0.00042 to 0.0021), corresponds to a 75 percent increase in the aver-
age number of afﬁliates in a given industry-pair-country combination: the average jumps
from 0.02 to 0.032.13 For employment, the unconditional effects are also large: an analo-
gous change in the direct requirements coefﬁcients implies that, on average, employment
increases from 5.5 employees in a given industry-pair-country combination to almost 17
employees.14
Thesebigeffectscomealmostentirelyfromtheextensivemargin. Wereportincolumns
3 and 6 the marginal effects for each regressor on the expected number of afﬁliates, and
afﬁliate employment, provided that we observe at least one afﬁliate in the industry-pair-
country cell. The intensive margin effects are tiny: an increase in the direct requirements
coefﬁcients from the 50th to the 75th percentile (i.e., from 0.00042 to 0.0021), corresponds
to an increase in the expected number of afﬁliates in a given industry pair and country
combination from 2.09 (the average across triplets with a positive number of U.S. afﬁli-
ates) to 2.091. Column 6 reports the marginal effects on afﬁliate employment conditional
on the existence of an afﬁliate. The same increase in the direct requirements coefﬁcients
is associated with an increase in employment in U.S. afﬁliates from 636 employees (the
average across industry-pair and country triplets with a positive number of U.S. afﬁliates)
to 637 employees.
4.2 Do Vertical Links Predict Intra-Firm Flows?
The previous set of results establishes that a vertical link between the industries of opera-
tionoftheparentandtheafﬁliateisagoodpredictorofmultinationalactivityacrosscoun-
tries and industries. This result coincides with Alfaro and Charlton (2009). Not having
13Computed as: FDI
0
apc = FDIapc + (u
v + d
v)drap, where drap = 0:0021   0:00042, and FDIapc =
FDI
+
apc  Pr(FDIapc > 0) = 2:09  0:0086 = 0:02 (the average number of afﬁliates across all possible
parent-afﬁliate industry-country triplets).
14This effect is calculated in an analogously way as the one explained in the previous footnote, using u
v
and d
v reported in column 5 of table 4, and FDIapc = FDI
+
apc  Pr(FDIapc > 0) = 636  0:0086 = 5:5
(average employment across industry-pair-country triplets with a positive number of employees in U.S.
afﬁliates, times the probability of observing an U.S. afﬁliate in such triplet).
15data on trade ﬂows between parents and afﬁliates, however, they interpret the presence
of a vertical link between parent and afﬁliate as the presence of vertical FDI, conjectur-
ing that these input-output links are accompanied by substantial ﬂows of physical goods
between parent and afﬁliate. We turn to this point next: Are input-output linkages able
to predict trade ﬂows between parents and afﬁliates? Does the presence of a vertical link
materialize as vertical FDI? Using data on the observed ﬂows of physical goods between
parents and afﬁliates, our answer is negative: while a vertical link is a good predictor of
the existence of a multinational ﬁrm, it is not associated with substantial intra-ﬁrm trade.
The descriptive statistics in table 3 (panel 2) present a ﬁrst overview of the characteris-
tics of intra-ﬁrm trade patterns between vertically linked establishments. Not only is the
share of intra-ﬁrm trade very small for the average afﬁliate, it is also remarkably invariant
with respect to the position of the afﬁliate in the vertical chain (downstream, upstream, or
neither of both, from parent). On average, only 6 percent of an afﬁliate’s sales are shipped
to the parent, irrespective of whether the afﬁliate operates in an upstream industry. Par-
ents provide less than 8 percent of an afﬁliate’s inputs, irrespective of whether the afﬁliate
operates in a downstream industry.
The same conclusion emerges from the histograms over the share of intra-ﬁrm ﬂows
for parent-afﬁliate pairs with industries related and non-related by I-O vertical links in
ﬁgures 4 and 5. Afﬁliate shipments to the parent are, for most of the afﬁliates, a very
small fraction of their sales. Moreover, it is not larger for afﬁliates operating in industries
upwards of their parents. Correspondingly, the share of afﬁliate inputs that are shipped
from the parent is, for most of the afﬁliates, very small, irrespective of whether afﬁliates
operate in industries downward from that of the parent.
Tocheckfortheimportanceofverticallinkswhilecontrollingforotherfactors, weturn
to the ﬁrm-level data. Given that only 40 percent of afﬁliates report positive shipments to
theparent, weestimatethefollowingTobitspeciﬁcation, whichcapturesthedeterminants
16of both the probability of reporting positive ﬂows and their magnitude,
Yapc = vV ertLinkap + cXc + sXp + csXc  Xp + pPp + apc: (2)
The dependent variable Yapc corresponds to shipments from afﬁliate a in host country c,
to the parent p, as share of the afﬁliate’s total sales.
The vectors Xc and Xp contain afﬁliate country controls, and parent industry charac-
teristics, as used in (1). In addition, we include the number of afﬁliates owned by the
parent and the total U.S.-located employment of the parent in Pp.
Wemeasuretheverticallinkbetweenanupstreamafﬁliateandthedownstreamparent
in two ways: (i) V ertLinkap = drap is the direct requirements coefﬁcient of the main indus-




i2A;j2P drij  sales
p
j
total salesa ; (3)
where total salesa is afﬁliate total sales and sales
p
j corresponds to parent sales in industry
j, which is observed in the data for the main seven industries of operation. drij is, as
before, thedirectrequirementscoefﬁcientofafﬁliateindustryiintheproductionofparent
industry j, according to the I-O matrix. This second measure aggregates the requirements
of all the afﬁliate’s industries into the production of all the industries of the parent. Since
sales by parents and afﬁliates are very skewed towards their primary industry, the two
alternative measures of the vertical links are similar.
Columns1-3intable5reporttheresultsfromestimatingequation(2)withandwithout
our variable of interest, V ertLinkap (column 2 and 3 correspond to the different measures
of vertical link: drap and vap, respectively). We ﬁnd that intra-ﬁrm shipments into the
United States are, as expected, signiﬁcantly lower for afﬁliates located in distant coun-
tries and greater for afﬁliates located in countries with high income per capita. Our mea-
sure of rule of law implies the opposite. Consistent with the descriptive statistics, larger
17multinational parents in terms of employment are associated with more intra-ﬁrm ﬂows
(non-reported). The coefﬁcient on our variables of interest, drap and vap, are negative, very
close to zero, and not signiﬁcant.
Columns 4, 5, and 6 of table 5 report the corresponding results for the intra-ﬁrm ﬂow
of goods for further processing from the parent to the afﬁliates. The baseline regression is
a Tobit speciﬁcation,
Ypac = vV ertLinkpa + cXc + sXp + csXc  Xp + pPp + pac: (4)
The dependent variable, Ypac, refers to shipments in goods for further processing from
the parent, p to the afﬁliate, a, in country c, as share of total afﬁliate input costs. The
set of country, industry, and parent controls is the same as in equation (2). Column 5
reports the results using, as a measure of vertical link, the direct requirements coefﬁcient
of the main industry of the parent in the production of the afﬁliate’s main industry (i.e.




i2A;j2P drji  salesa
i
total input costsa ; (5)
where afﬁliate sales in industry i, salesa
i, are available for the main seven industries of
operation, and afﬁliate total input costs, total input costsa, are observed in the data. This
measure captures the potential importance of all inputs produced by the parent in the
afﬁliate’s multi-product production.
Distance between the location of the afﬁliate and the U.S. is, again, a signiﬁcant pre-
dictor of intra-ﬁrm ﬂows. Afﬁliates located in countries with poor rule of laws receive a
signiﬁcantly larger fraction of their inputs from the parent. Our measures of the vertical
link between the upstream industry of the parent and the downstream industry of the
afﬁliate are not a signiﬁcant predictor of ﬂows of unﬁnished goods from the parent to the
afﬁliate. Moreover, the marginal Tobit coefﬁcients on the probability of the existence of
18a positive intra-ﬁrm ﬂow from the parent even decreases with the strength of the vertical
link between parent and afﬁliate (non reported).
In Section 6, we show that the results found in this section are robust to different
deﬁnitions of the measure of a vertical link, and to the empirical speciﬁcation.
5 Discussion
We established above that most multinational ﬁrms own foreign afﬁliates operating both
upstream and downstream in vertically linked industries. But, for the most part, these
afﬁliates ship a surprisingly small share of their production to the parent operating in a
downstream industry, and they receive a very small share of their physical inputs from
upstream parents. Moreover, most of the afﬁliates in these vertically linked chains appear
to sell almost exclusively to local unrelated parties. These results raise the question about
the motives for not only owning foreign afﬁliates, but also the ﬁrm’s multi-product pat-
terns. Why do multinational ﬁrms own internationally segmented production chains if
not for the transfer of physical goods along it? Our proposed answer to this question is in
line with the answer given by Hortacsu and Syverson (2009) for U.S. domestic ﬁrms: the
vertical chain within the ﬁrm exists for the purpose of transferring intangible goods such
as know-how, brands, and organizational capabilities along it. These intangibles can be
transmitted internationally to the afﬁliates within the ﬁrm, and they can be a source of
comparative advantage in the production of vertically linked goods, even in the absence
of physical shipments between afﬁliates.
The results in this paper can be easily rationalized within the now benchmark frame-
work of horizontal FDI in Helpman et al. (2004), by incorporating this additional source
of comparative advantage in the production of vertically linked goods. Consider multi-
product ﬁrms as in Bernard, Redding and Schott (2011): Each ﬁrm i with ideas for a
vector of differentiated goods ! = [!1:::!N] has a vector of productivity coefﬁcient zi =
19[zi(!1);zi(!2);:::;zi(!N)] drawn from a joint distribution function Fi(z). These parameters
enter into the production of a good !n by an afﬁliate in country c within the corporation
as
yic(!n) = zi(!n)Lic(!n) (6)
where yic(!n) is the total amount produced of good !n in country c, and L is the bundle
of factors used in production (hired in the country of production).
Theproductivityvectorzi(!)oftheﬁrmandthedistributionfunctionF(z)arereduced-
form representations of the sources of comparative advantage for the ﬁrm: why are some
ﬁrms more productive than others? how does a ﬁrm’s comparative advantage in the pro-
duction of one good translate to other potential products? According to the empirical
ﬁndings in this paper, the properties of the joint distribution function are related to the
I-O matrix: ﬁrms tend to have comparative advantage in producing goods related by
vertical links. Formally,
@ Pr(z(!n) > zmjz(!k) > zm)
@drnk
> 0
@ Pr(z(!n) > zmjz(!k) > zm)
@drkn
> 0 (7)
where Pr(z(!n) > zmjz(!k) > zm) is the probability that the productivity draw for good
!n within a ﬁrm i is larger than the threshold zm, given that the productivity draw for
good !k is large enough. drnk (drkn) corresponds to the direct requirements coefﬁcients
for input !n into the production of good !k (input !k into good !n, resp.).
The source of this correlation within the ﬁrm can be interpreted in different ways. As
showninﬁgure3, mostindustriesrequireinputsfromsimilarindustries: theentriesinthe
direct requirements matrix tend to be largest on or near the diagonal. Consider, for exam-
ple, the case of Converted Paper Products (NAICS 3222)—i.e., stationary and envelopes—
which uses Paper (NAICS 3221) as its main input. Presumably, the production of these
goods involve similar knowledge about the quality of the materials, demand, suppliers,
and competitors. This commonly required knowledge can be understood as the capacity
20to solve related problems, as in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), or as the stock of
technology capital, as in McGrattan and Prescott (2010), speciﬁc to goods with similar char-
acteristics, or the stock of knowledge capital that is public good within the corporation,
as the seminal work of Markusen. If this is the case, the ﬁrm may have comparative ad-
vantage in producing vertically linked goods even in the absence of intra-ﬁrm physical
ﬂows.
6 Robustness
This section explores the robustness of our results to different empirical speciﬁcations and
alternative measures of the vertical links between the afﬁliate and the parent.
6.1 Alternative Empirical Speciﬁcations
Anymeasureofintra-ﬁrmtradeﬂowsmaybecontaminatedbythereportingofartiﬁcially
low values of goods traded, a phenomenon known as transfer pricing. While transfer pric-
ing may bias downward the value of trade reported, it is unlikely a ﬁrm with signiﬁcant
intra-ﬁrm trade could report zero trade. Given that one of the most striking features of
our results is the low number of parent-afﬁliate pairs reporting any intra-ﬁrm ﬂows, we
estimate the following linear probability model,
d(Yapc) = vV ertLinkap + cXc + sXp + csXc  Xp + pPp + apc: (8)
The dependent variable is a binary variable d(Yapc) (d(Ypac) for ﬂows from the parent to
the afﬁliate) that takes value one if shipments from the afﬁliate to the parent are positive
and zero otherwise. Arguably, transfer prices cannot contaminate this 1-0 variable for
the existence of intra-ﬁrm ﬂows. The results from estimating (8) are reported in columns
1 and 2 of table 6 for the ﬂows from the afﬁliate to the parent, and columns 3 and 4
21for exports from the parent to the afﬁliate. In all cases, the coefﬁcients of interest are
non signiﬁcant or have a negative sign: a larger vertical link is associated with a lower
probability of ﬁnding ﬂows between the parent and the afﬁliate.
We also estimate an empirical speciﬁcation for the importance of vertical chains in
explaining the intensive margin of intra-ﬁrm ﬂows; that is, the magnitude of the ﬂow
given that is positive. We restrict the sample of afﬁliate-parent pairs to only those that
report positive shipments. In the case of ﬂows from the afﬁliate to the parent, the sample
is restricted to only 40 percent of the original observations. In the case of shipments from
the parent to the afﬁliate, the sample is reduced by approximately 50 percent (see table
3). Columns 5 to 8 in table 6 report the elasticities of intra-ﬁrm trade to changes in our
measure of vertical link, based on the OLS speciﬁcation,
log(Yapc) = v log(V ertLinkap) + cXc + sXp + csXc  Xp + pPp + apc: (9)
The dependent variable is log(Yapc) for positive ﬂows from the afﬁliate to the parent and
log(Ypac) for ﬂows from the parent to the afﬁliate.
Again in this speciﬁcation, vertical links are not found to be a statistically signiﬁcant
predictor of intra-ﬁrm ﬂows and their point estimates are very close to zero. Only in
one speciﬁcation, using vap deﬁned in (3) as measure of vertical link, is the elasticity of
sales from the afﬁliates to the parent found to be signiﬁcantly different from zero (column
6). The economic signiﬁcance of this elasticity is very small: a 10 percent increase in the
measure of vertical link is associated with a 0.5 percent increase in the share of afﬁliate
sales shipped to the parent: from 0.15 (the mean, conditional on positive ﬂows) to 0.151.
6.2 Alternative Measures of Vertical Links
In this section we replicate the results in table 5 using different measures of vertical link-
ages.
22Columns 1-2 and 5-6 in table 7 present the results for the Tobit regression in equations
(2) and (4) using total requirements (instead of direct requirements) coefﬁcients as a mea-
sure of vertical links. The estimates of the effect are either non signiﬁcant or the point
estimates have the opposite sign than what is expected.
The strong diagonal in the matrix of direct requirements, shown in ﬁgures 3a and
3b, introduces a source of ambiguity into the interpretations of our results. Afﬁliates
operating in the same industry as the parent could be interpreted to follow a horizontal
motive. However, given the often large direct requirements coefﬁcient for the diagonal
elements, they are also consistent with a vertical motive for FDI. To avoid any source of
ambiguity in this matter, we estimate the Tobit regressions in (2) and (4) excluding all
observations with afﬁliates and parents operating in the same industry. The results are
presented in columns 3 and 4 for ﬂows from the afﬁliate to the parent, and columns 7
and 8 for shipments from the parent to the afﬁliate. The restricted sample is 2777 parent-
afﬁliate pairs, approximately 40 percent of the total sample (see table 3).
Results for shipments from the afﬁliate to the parent are reported in columns 3 and 4
of table 7, for the two alternative measures of vertical links. Again, vertical links are not
found to be a signiﬁcant predictor of intra-ﬁrm shipments back to the U.S. In the case of
ﬂows from the parent to the afﬁliate, the exclusion of all parent and afﬁliate pairs that
operate in the same primary industry substantially affects the results. Columns 7 and 8
report that ﬂows from the parent to the afﬁliate are signiﬁcantly larger when the parent
operates in an upstream industry relative to the afﬁliate; a parent’s supply of physical
inputs to its afﬁliate is correlated to the I-O links between the industries of operations
of the two establishments. For instance, estimates in column 7 imply that an increase in
the direct requirements coefﬁcient from the 50th to the 75th percentile (excluding same-
industry pairs) between the upstream industry of the parent and downstream industry
of the afﬁliate is associated with an increase in the share of shipments from the parent
in goods for further processing of 1 percent for the mean afﬁliate, which is 0.081 in our
23sample (see table 2).
That we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between vertical linkages and trade ﬂows for
parents and afﬁliates in different industries may be reﬂecting the coarseness of the ISI
classiﬁcation. Alfaro and Charlton (2009), using data classiﬁed by 4 digit SIC, ﬁnd that
many parent-afﬁliate pairs operate in industries that are “close” to each other: they share
the same 3 digit SIC industry, but have different 4 digit SIC industries. In our data’s
classiﬁcation, there are 77 manufacturing industries compared to the 459 manufacturing
industries in the 1987 SIC. The industry classiﬁcation does not affect, however, our ﬁrm
level results about the prevalence of intraﬁrm trade: parents and afﬁliates ship very little
to each other.
Overall,the links found between the industries of operation of parents and afﬁliates
are not found to be signiﬁcant predictors of the existence, nor the magnitude, of intra-ﬁrm
ﬂows, which are in all cases a very small fraction of an afﬁliate’s sales and inputs. This
is particularly relevant in the case of intra-ﬁrm shipments to the United States: afﬁliates
sell most of their production in the local market, and the share that is shipped to the
United States is very small, irrespective of whether those goods may be inputs into the
production of the parent.
7 Conclusion
Using conﬁdential ﬁrm-level data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, this paper un-
covers new facts on the behavior of U.S. multinational ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that intra-ﬁrm trade
is concentrated among a small number of very large afﬁliates. For the large majority of
afﬁliates, shipments to the parent account for a very small fraction of total sales, and ship-
ments of goods for further processing from the parent accounts for a small share of total
input cost. For most U.S. foreign afﬁliates, local unrelated parties are the main destina-
tion of sales. In this sense, “horizontal” FDI, as opposed to “vertical” FDI, seems to better
24capture the role of the majority of U.S. afﬁliates abroad.
Despite the lack of intra-ﬁrm trade, relative to the overall activity of afﬁliates, we ﬁnd
that multinational corporations often own vertical production chains: most afﬁliates op-
erate in industries upstream or downstream from those of the parent. Nonetheless, these
vertical links are not matched with a corresponding intra-ﬁrm ﬂow of physical goods be-
tween upstream and downstream units of production. More precisely, the presence of
a vertical link between parent and afﬁliate, as deﬁned by the input-output matrix, does
not predict the existence of, or volume of, intra-ﬁrm ﬂows. This fact suggests that the
comparative advantage of multinational ﬁrms is not the ability to transfer physical goods
within the corporation. Rather, we conjecture that corporations may have a compara-
tive advantage in producing vertically related goods that share intangible inputs, such as
managerial ability or organizational capital.
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sales from affiliate to parent, as share of total affiliate sales
All Industries All Manufacturing North American Autos
Notes: Majority-owned foreign afﬁliates of U.S. parents that are required to report intra-
ﬁrm ﬂows in the BEA survey benchmark year 1999. “All industries” includes parent-
afﬁliate pairs in all sectors of the economy. “All manufacturing” includes parent-afﬁliate
pairs in which both the parent and the afﬁliate are in the manufacturing sector. “North
American Autos” includes only parent-afﬁliate pairs both in the auto industry, operating
in Canada and Mexico.



































sales from parent to affiliate, as share of input costs of affiliate 
All Industries All Manufacturing North American Autos
Notes: Majority-owned foreign afﬁliates of U.S. parents that are required to report intra-
ﬁrm ﬂows in the BEA survey benchmark year 1999. “All industries” includes parent-
afﬁliate pairs in all sectors of the economy. “All manufacturing” includes parent-afﬁliate
pairs in which both the parent and the afﬁliate are in the manufacturing sector. “North
American Autos” includes only parent-afﬁliate pairs both in the auto industry, operating
in Canada and Mexico. Sales from parent to afﬁliate refers to goods for further processing
only.
31Figure 3: The 1997 direct requirements matrix
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Notes: Manufacturing goods only (BEA ISI codes between 3111 and 3399); The x-axis is the
using industry and the y-axis is the producing industry. In the left panel we have placed a mark
at each industry pair where the direct requirements coefﬁcient is between 0.001 and 0.05. In the
right panelwe have placeda mark ateach industry pairwhere the directrequirements coefﬁcient
is larger than 0.05.



































sales from affiliate to parent, as share of total sales
Ip = Ia Ip ≠ Ia Ip ≠ Ia & dap>0 Ip ≠ Ia & dpa>0
Notes: Ia = Ibincludes parent-afﬁliate pairs operating in the same primary industry. Ip 6=
Ia corresponds to parent-afﬁliate pairs operating in different industries; which are further
decomposed into afﬁliate-industry pairs with afﬁliate operating in upward industry (Ip 6=
Ia;dap > 0) and downward (Ip 6= Ia;dpa > 0).




































sales to affiliate, goods for further proc., as share of input costs of affiliate
Ip = Ia Ip ≠ Ia Ip ≠ Ia & dap>0 Ip ≠ Ia & dpa>0
Notes: Ia = Ib includes parent-afﬁliate pairs operating in the same primary industry.
Ip 6= Ia corresponds to parent-afﬁliate pairs operating in different industries; this group is
further decomposed into parent-afﬁliate pairs with afﬁliate operating in upstream indus-
try (Ip 6= Ia;dap > 0) and downstream industry (Ip 6= Ia;dpa > 0).
34Table 1: Sample Construction
Universe Parent-afﬁliate in mfg.
All Sample All Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# Parents 3,970 2,410 1,654 1,107
# Afﬁliates 40,155 19,540 12,028 6,926
Total P sales 6,274,285,285 5,631,107,004 2,574,363,335 2,455,057,523
Total A sales 2,705,066,210 2,195,819,121 1,162,955,126 985,918,430
# P-Industries 191 184 75 74
# A-Industries 195 191 77 77
# Countries 189 166 142 108
Notes: Columns 2-4 describe the sample of majority-owned afﬁliates that are required to report
intra-ﬁrm ﬂows in the BEA survey benchmark year 1999. Sales expressed in thousands of US
dollars. The “manufacturing” sample includes only the parent-afﬁliate pairs in which the primary
industry of both the parent and afﬁliate are in manufacturing.
35Table 2: Summary Statistics
All Parent & Afﬁliate in mfg
Mean Median Weighted Ave Mean Median Weighted Ave
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel 1: Number of industries
# A industries 1.30 1.00 1.57 1.41 1.00 1.68
# P industries 2.36 2.00 3.42 2.64 2.00 3.96
Panel 2: Share of sales in main industry
Afﬁliate 0.957 1.00 0.923 0.95 1 0.92
Afﬁliate-country aggregate 0.911 1.00 0.835 0.89 1 0.81
Parent 0.838 0.99 0.750 0.81 0.93 0.72
Panel 3: Share of afﬁliate sales
to local unafﬁliated parties 0.821 1.00 0.716 0.76 0.97 0.58
to parent 0.043 0.00 0.082 0.06 0.00 0.12
Panel 4: Share of afﬁliate shipments from parent
for distribution 0.038 0.00 0.01 0.001 0.00 0.004
for further processing 0.031 0.00 0.05 0.081 0.001 0.081
Notes: Columns 2 and 5 report the average of the 9 ﬁrms surrounding the median. In columns 3 and 6 the average
is weighted by afﬁliate employment. zAn observation is the aggregate over all afﬁliates of a parent, by country.
3
6Table 3: Vertical Links
IP = IA IP 6= IA
all drap = drpa > 0 other all drap > 0 drpa > 0 other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel 1: Number of afﬁliates
total 4076 4062 14 2777 2211 1869 244
share with shipments to parent > 0 0.40 0.40 0.36 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.38
share with shipments from parent > 0 0.53 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.49 0.48
Panel 2: Avg. afﬁliate shipment size
to parent (share of total sales) 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.04
from parenty (share of total input costs) 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06
to local unafﬁliated (share of total sales) 0.75 0.75 0.85 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.73
Notes: Figures correspond to the sample of manufacturing parent and afﬁliates in column 4 of table 1. drap > 0
corresponds to all afﬁliates for which the direct requirements of its main industry into the production of the main
industry of the parent is positive. Correspondingly, drpa > 0 corresponds to all afﬁliates for which its main industry
of operation uses as inputs the main industry of the parent. ygoods for further processing
3
7Table 4: Vertical Links and FDI ﬂows
Dep. Variable: # afﬁliatesapc employmentapc
(1) (2a) (2b) (3) (4a) (4b)
drap 3:975 0:324 3;288:0 266:2
(0:248) (384:3)
drpa 4:213 0:343 3;510:0 284:1
(0:294) (385:5)
log(gdpc) 1:322 1:291 0:105 1;099:0 1;110:0 89:8
(0:065) (0:066) (115:1) (120:0)
log(gdplc) 1:240 1:220 0:099 946:3 957:1 77:5
(0:157) (0:157) (151:6) (157:6)
log(distancec)  0:800  0:762  0:062  671:5  662:3  53:6
(0:080) (0:079) (94:1) (95:9)
log(lawc) 0:842 0:845 0:069 668:2 689:7 55:8
(0:257) (0:259) (220:1) (229:3)
log(k=gdpc)  0:931  0:960  0:078  652:8  690:2  55:9
(0:275) (0:273) (229:8) (235:7)
log(schoolingc)  0:069  0:579  0:047  341:9  764:1  61:9
(0:645) (0:636) (542:3) (560:5)
Ind controls yes yes yes yes
P controls yes yes yes yes
Observations 379456 379456 379456 379456
Positive obs. 3277 3277 3277 3277
Pseudo R2 adj. 0.074 0.124 0.037 0.061
Notes: Results from the Tobit regression in (1). In columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable is the number
of afﬁliates in industry a in country c owned by parents in industry p. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent
variable is aggregate employment in afﬁliates in industry a in country c owned by parents in industry p.
Columns 2b and 4b report the marginal effects on the expected value of the dependent variable, conditional
on being positive. Industry controls include physical and human capital intensities, as well as their inter-
action with the respective country factor abundance. Parent controls include total employment and total
number of foreign afﬁliates. Robust S.E., clustered at the country-main industry of the parent level, are in
parentheses. Levels of signiﬁcance are denoted  p < 0:01,  p < 0:05, and  p < 0:1.
38Table 5: Vertical Links and Intra-Firm Shipments
Dep. Variable: Yapc Ypac





log(gdpc)  0:009  0:009  0:009 0:001 0:001 0:001
(0:007) (0:007) (0:007) (0:005) (0:005) (0:005)
log(gdplc) 0:044 0:044 0:042  0:013  0:013  0:013
(0:023) (0:023) (0:023) (0:014) (0:014) (0:014)
log(distancec)  0:064  0:064  0:064  0:032  0:032  0:032
(0:009) (0:009) (0:009) (0:006) (0:006) (0:006)
log(lawc)  0:124  0:125  0:120  0:087  0:088  0:088
(0:060) (0:060) (0:060) (0:027) (0:027) (0:027)
log(k=gdpc) 0:039 0:039 0:038 0:0158 0:015 0:016
(0:047) (0:047) (0:047) (0:028) (0:027) (0:027)
log(schoolingc) 0:106 0:106 0:109 0:034 0:033 0:033
(0:110) (0:110) (0:111) (0:061) (0:061) (0:061)
Ind controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
P controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
pseudo R2 adj 0.060 0.060 0.068 0.055 0.055 0.055
Observations 6638 6638 6638 6638 6638 6638
Notes: In Columns 1-3, the dependent variable, Yapc, is shipments from afﬁliate to parent as a share of the
afﬁliate’s total sales. dr = drap is the direct requirements coefﬁcient of the main industry of the afﬁliate in
the production of the parent’s main industry, and v = vap is the measure of vertical link deﬁned in (3). In
columns 4-6, the dependent variable, Ypac, is exports from parent to afﬁliate as a share of the afﬁliate’s total
input cost, dr = drpa is the direct requirements coefﬁcient of main industry of the parent in the production
of the afﬁliate’s main industry, and v = vpa is the measure of vertical link deﬁned in (5). Industry controls
include physical and human capital intensities of the parent industry, as well as their interaction with the
respective country factor abundance. Parent controls include total employment and total number of foreign
afﬁliates. Robust S.E., clustered at the country-main industry of the parent level, are in parentheses. Levels
of signiﬁcance are denoted  p < 0:01,  p < 0:05, and  p < 0:1.
39Table 6: Robustness. Alternative Empirical Speciﬁcation
Dep. Variable: d(Yapc) d(Ypac) log(Yapc) log(Ypac)









log(gdpc)  0:156 0:020 0:015 0:014  0:262  0:256  0:110  0:110
(0:112) (0:007) (0:007) (0:007) (0:057) (0:057) (0:0419) (0:042)
log(gdplc) 0:020 0:115 0:016 0:016  0:689  0:665  0:227  0:229
(0:007) (0:024) (0:027) (0:027) (0:243) (0:243) (0:135) (0:135)
log(distancec) 0:115  0:073  0:024  0:024  0:431  0:427  0:231  0:231
(0:024) (0:010) (0:009) (0:009) (0:067) (0:067) (0:043) (0:043)
log(lawc)  0:073  0:066  0:177  0:176  0:865  0:832  0:342  0:342
(0:010) (0:052) (0:047) (0:047) (0:499) (0:498) (0:229) (0:229)
log(k=gdpc)  0:066  0:013  0:032  0:031 0:517 0:509 0:081 0:080
(0:052) (0:051) (0:046) (0:046) (0:411) (0:411) (0:253) (0:253)
log(schoolingc)  0:012 0:111  0:004  0:005 0:281 0:267 0:246 0:245
(0:051) (0:107) (0:108) (0:108) (0:974) (0:973) (0:586) (0:586)
Ind controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
P controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 (adj) 0.047 0.047 0.021 0.021 0.121 0.122 0.043 0.043
Observations 6638 6638 6638 6638 2355 2355 2984 2984
Notes: Columns 1-2 and 3-4 correspond to the linear probability model in equation (8), for ﬂows from
afﬁliate to parent (Yapc) and parent to afﬁliate (Ypac), respectively. Columns 5-6 and 7-8 report the results
for the OLS estimation of equation (9), for intra-ﬁrm ﬂows to and from the parent. In columns 1-2 and
5-6, the measures of vertical links are dr = drap and v = vap. In columns 3-4 and 7-8 the measures are
dr = drpa and v = vpa. Industry controls include physical and human capital intensities of the parent’s
industry, as well as their interaction with the respective country factor abundance. Parent controls include
total employment and total number of foreign afﬁliates. Robust S.E., clustered at the country-main industry
of the parent level, are in parentheses. Levels of signiﬁcance are denoted  p < 0:01,  p < 0:05, and 
p < 0:1.
40Table 7: Robustness. Alternative Measures of Vertical Links
Dep. Variable: Yapc Ypac









log(gdpc) 8;494 8;357 1;872 8;847 0:001 0:001  0:005 0:001
(9;850) (9;840) (1;196) (9;972) (0:004) (0:004) (0:006) (0:005)
log(gdplc) 115;949 113;085 13;005 113;703  0:013  0:012  0:056  0:014
(55;269) (54;192) (5;011) (54;421) (0:014) (0:014) (0:020) (0:014)
log(distancec)  71;843  71;300  12;703  71;000  0:032  0:033  0:038  0:032
(41;566) (41;371) (3;345) (41;278) (0:006) (0:006) (0:010) (0:006)
log(lawc)  76;620  72;766  9;558  72;042  0:089  0:089  0:062  0:085
(62;141) (62;183) (8;195) (61;564) (0:027) (0:027) (0:037) (0:027)
log(k=gdpc) 9;823 9;453 6;701 9;308 0:015 0:015 0:073 0:014
(56;541) (56;575) (8;005) (56;780) (0:027) (0:027) (0:036) (0:028)
log(schoolingc)  170;381  164;191  9;869  168;294 0:034 0:032 0:157 0:038
(229;866) (227;756) (27;292) (229;659) (0:061) (0:061) (0:095) (0:061)
Ind controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
P controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Pseudo R2 (adj) 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.057 0.059 0.046 0.057
Observations 6638 6638 2700 6638 6638 6638 2700 6638
Notes: In columns 1-4, the dependent variable, Yapc, is shipments from afﬁliate to parent as share of the
afﬁliate’s total sales; In columns 5-8, it is Yapc, goods for further processing shipped from the parent as a
share of the afﬁliate’s total inputs. In columns 1-2 and 5-6, the two measures of vertical links are deﬁned
using totalrequirements coefﬁcients: tr = trap andtr = trpa in columns 1 and5; andvtr = vtr
ap andvtr = vtr
pa
in columns 2 and 6. In columns 3-4 and 7-8, the sample is restricted to parent and afﬁliates operating in
different industries; The measures drex
ap and drex
pa in columns 2 and 7, and vex
ap and vex
pa in columns 4 and
8 exclude the coefﬁcients in the diagonal of the direct requirements coefﬁcient matrix. Industry controls
include physical and human capital intensities of the parent’s industry, as well as their interaction with the
respective country factor abundance. Parent controls include total employment and total number of foreign
afﬁliates. Robust S.E., clustered at the country-main industry of the parent level, are in parentheses. Levels
of signiﬁcance are denoted  p < 0:01,  p < 0:05, and  p < 0:1.
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